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Abstract
Although many prior studies have discussed the effect of discount pricing and product bundling on sales, few 
investigated the effect on Game as a Service (GaaS) applications, which has been rapidly growing in the IT 
industry. We investigate the effect by adopting large empirical market data, including 112,858 observations of 
5,570 GaaS applications in the theoretical perspective of perceived value, price fairness, expected utility, and 
competitive intensity. We found that both discount pricing and bundling have positive effects on the daily sales of 
the applications. Specifically, discount rate and the amount of discounted price (i.e., reduced price) have positive 
relationships with the sales increase, while the effect of discount pricing decreases as more discount deals are 
available in the market. However, we did not find a significant interaction effect of bundling on the relationship 
between discount rate and the sales increase. 
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ABSTRACT 
Although many prior studies have discussed the effect of discount pricing and product bundling on sales, few 
investigated the effect on Game as a Service (GaaS) applications, which has been rapidly growing in the IT industry. 
We investigate the effect by adopting large empirical market data, including 112,858 observations of 5,570 GaaS 
applications in the theoretical perspective of perceived value, price fairness, expected utility, and competitive intensity. 
We found that both discount pricing and bundling have positive effects on the daily sales of the applications. 
Specifically, discount rate and the amount of discounted price (i.e., reduced price) have positive relationships with the 
sales increase, while the effect of discount pricing decreases as more discount deals are available in the market.  
However, we did not find a significant interaction effect of bundling on the relationship between discount rate and the 
sales increase. 
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1. Introduction
One of the most noticeable trends in the contemporary IT industry is the rapid growth of cloud computing,
providing information technology (IT) services through the Internet, such as the services for networks, servers, storage, 
and applications [Armbrust et al. 2010; Mell & Grance 2011].  According to Gartner Inc. and Forbes [2016], the global 
market revenue of cloud computing has increased from $58.6 billion in 2009 to $175 billion in 2015, approximately 
300% growth for six years.  In business, 95% of the organizations are currently relying on cloud computing services 
for their business [RightScale 2016].  The industry expects that the explosive growth will continue due to its 
managerial benefits such as reduced operational costs, flexibility, scalability, rapid deployment, remote access and 
mobility, and green computing.     
Cloud computing can be categorized into three platform models by the capability provided to users: Infrastructure 
as a Service (IaaS), Platform as a Service (PaaS), and Software as a Service (SaaS) [Mell & Grance 2011].  Among 
the services, SaaS is the most popularly used, driving the overall growth of the industry.  In 2015, SaaS applications 
generated approximately 61% of the cloud computing industry revenue [Technology Business Research 2015].   The 
video gaming industry is one of the IT domains that has actively adopted the cloud-computing platform, particularly 
SaaS due to its capability to offer interactions between the users and to update gaming contents.  In the mobile app 
market, for instance, a large portion of the game apps rely on the SaaS platform [Lowthorpe et al. 2013].  The format 
of conventional video games are also moving from tangible software packages (i.e., ROM pack and CD) to the SaaS 
platform, which is called cloud gaming or games as a service (GaaS) [Gopal & Kaushik 2016].  It allows the players 
to use gaming applications on the cloud via either file or video streaming.  It also enables them to enjoy games with 
other users who access to the cloud platform (e.g., servers). 
According to research conducted by Software Advice, a subsidiary of Gartner Group, the two most popular 
marketing strategies in the U.S. are discount pricing and bundling [Wolf 2015].  Discount pricing can increase product 
sales by affecting the evaluation of consumers on product value [Chen et al. 2012; Dawson & Kim 2009; Sheng et al. 
2007; Yin & Jin-Song 2014].  Prior literature discussed its effect in various domains such as apparel [Alford & Biswas 
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2002], food [Mishra & Mishra 2011], electronics [Della Bitta et al. 1981], and automobile [Goldberg 1996].  The 
literature commonly indicated a positive impact of discount pricing on the consumer value perception on product 
[Alford & Biswas 2002; Della Bitta et al. 1981], intention to purchase and purchase incidence [Mishra & Mishra 
2011], and net profit of the product vendors when it is used at an optimized level [Lee & Rosenblatt 1986; Monahan 
1984].  Bundling, the other popular marketing strategy, can encourage the consumers’ purchase by offering additional 
values [Stremersch & Tellis 2002].  Extant literature for product bundling reported its positive effect on sales increase 
in various product domains, such as digital music [Zhu & MacQuarrie 2003], mobile TV services [Rautio et al. 2006], 
and video gaming console and software [Derdenger & Kumar 2013].   
However, some academic literature and business reports have warned that the strategies may negatively affect 
sales. Concerning discount pricing, they argued that it induces a low-quality perception on products [DelVecchio & 
Puligadda 2012; Raghubir & Corfman 1999] and thus, may discourage their sales.  Marketing practitioners also 
suggested the same ideas on discount pricing.  According to double-blind tests on drug, health products, and cosmetics, 
the discount deals actually appeal less to consumers than products at full price [Dennedy & Marrs 2011].  Product 
bundling also can impose the negative effect on sales because it may decrease the perceived quality and increase the 
perceived risk related to the purchase. Particularly, when the bundled product is new to market [Harris 1997] or 
combined with invaluable free gifts, it can harm the perceived quality [Krishna et al. 2002] and accordingly, may 
decrease the sales. 
Although numerous studies discussed discount pricing and bundling in various market domains, there are several 
research gaps, allowing further investigation on the topics.  As discussed, first, the studies reported contradictory 
findings on the effect of discount pricing and bundling and little discussed their effect in the GaaS market.  Therefore, 
their effect remains ambiguous in the domain.  Second, the literature on discount pricing and bundling mainly focused 
on their impact for conventional, tangible products, which are different from SaaS products.  Different from tangible 
products, which discount pricing or bundling cannot be easily applied or modified, SaaS products are highly 
amendable to such changes based on market reaction [Wan et al. 2017].  In addition, consumers in the SaaS domain 
are able to monitor price changes and compare them over almost all available products at convenient online 
distribution channels with substantially lower search cost.  Such well-informed consumers may react differently to the 
offers than those in conventional markets.  For example, the informed consumers would not purchase a SaaS product 
at discount if they had found the quality of the product is poor (e.g., online consumer review valence) or it is unpopular 
(e.g., online ranking list) in the market.  Third, little research examined the effect of both discount pricing and bundling 
adopting empirical data of the GaaS market.  Lastly, although a few recent studies tested the effect of discount pricing 
for digital products [Ghose & Han 2014],  they neglected to consider competitive intensity, which refers to the degree 
of competition in a market (e.g., the number of competitors offering discount deals).  The effect can be substantial or 
insignificant according to the number of competitors providing similar offers  [Raju 1992].  However, such a critical 
factor has not be considered in the extant digital product research on discount pricing.  These research gaps suggest 
several interesting questions:  
 
RQ1: Do discount pricing and bundling increase or decrease sales of GaaS applications?  
RQ2: Is discount pricing more effective than bundling for sales increase when applied to bundled applications?  
RQ3: Does competitive intensity affect the effectiveness of discount pricing for GaaS applications? 
 
To address these questions, we examine the effect of discount pricing and bundling on the sales of GaaS 
applications, adopting a large panel dataset including 112,858 observations of 5,570 GaaS applications.  Particularly, 
we seek to clarify (1) the effectiveness of discount pricing given discount rate and the amount of discounted price, (2) 
the effectiveness of bundling strategies as well as its interaction effect on discount rate, and (3) the impact of the 
number of discount deals offered in the market.  We expect that our findings contribute to the knowledge concerning 
perceived value, price fairness, expected utility, and competitive intensity with empirical evidences as well as 
providing useful implications to the practitioners in the GaaS market.   
 
2. Literature Review 
2.1. Research on Discount Pricing 
Discount pricing refers to reduction of the initial price of a product or service [Chen et al. 1998], which is effective 
in increasing sales volume in a short time [Guerreiro et al. 2004].  It has been extensively investigated in the context 
of diverse markets such as apparel [Alford & Biswas 2002], food [Han et al. 2001; Mishra & Mishra 2011], electronics 
[Della Bitta et al. 1981], automobile [Ayres 1991; Ayres & Siegelman 1995; Goldberg 1996], and e-commerce [Ghose 
& Han 2014; Zuo & Iida 2017].  These studies adopted perceived product value to explain its effect on product sales.  
Since price discount induces higher value perception on proposed products with discount, buying intention of 
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consumers increases [Alford & Biswas 2002; Della Bitta et al. 1981; Nusair et al. 2010].   In general, the value 
perception increases when the level of discount (i.e., discount rate or discounted price) is higher [Coulter & Coulter 
2007; Lee & Rosenblatt 1986; Monahan 1984] because consumers can attain desired benefits at lower price than their 
reference price.   
The effect of discount pricing can differ by various conditions.  For instance, females and minorities (e.g., African 
Americans in the U.S.) tend to be more sensitive to price changes when purchasing vehicles [Ayres 1991; Ayres & 
Siegelman 1995].  Original product price also can influence the value perception and purchase intention of consumers.  
Coulter and Coulter [2007] found that consumers tend to have greater value perception and intention to purchase for 
the higher-priced products offered at lower discount rate than for the lower-priced products at higher discount rate.  
This finding corresponds to the results of DelVecchio and Puligadda [2012] and Raghubir and Corfman [1999], 
suggesting that discount may induce a low quality perception on products and thus, discourage consumers to purchase. 
Therefore, optimal discount pricing is crucial to maximize sales of the product.   Recent e-commerce research 
examined the optimal discount level. Ghose and Han [2014] investigated the effect of discount pricing on the sales of 
mobile apps, using empirical data collected from Googleplay.com.  They reported that an optimized price discount, 
approximately 50%, maximizes the sales of mobile apps.  Zuo and Iida [2017] also illustrated that an effective discount 
rate ranges between 49% and 64% for the products in Amazon.JP (Amazon Japan).  
2.2. Research on Bundling 
Bundling is a widespread marketing practice to increase sales, offering two or more individual products in one 
package [Sheng et al. 2007; Wan et al. 2017].  Due to its effectiveness, it has been employed in various market domains.  
For instance, telecommunications companies offer their services, such as cable TV, Internet broadband, and telephone, 
in bundles to attract or retain their customers [Sheng et al. 2007].  Although it is generally beneficial for business, 
extant studies presented that its success relies on various factors.  Complementarity between bundled items is one of 
the determinants for success of the strategy. When the items complement each other (e.g., TV and DVD player), 
consumers are more likely to purchase the bundle [Koukova et al. 2008; Lee & Kwon 2011; Popkowski Leszczyc & 
Häubl 2010].   Likewise, similarity between bundled items (e.g., electricity/gas bundle for heating and air conditioning) 
increases the effect of bundling [Agarwal & Chatterjee 2003].  Price is another critical determinant.  Shen et al.  [2007] 
illustrated that when a bundle is offered at a discounted price, consumers tend to consider it poor quality although 
complementarity between the items can lessen such a perception.   For mixed CD bundles, however, Lee et al. [2011] 
found that as price discount for both the focal item and the added item increases, the purchase intention does, 
suggesting that higher discount on bundled products can enhance their sales.  Product brand also affects the 
effectiveness of bundling.   The effect tends to decrease when bundled items have different brands [Chung et al. 2013] 
or when they do not have an established brand reputation in the market [Lee et al. 2011].  
2.3. Summary of Literature Review 
As summarized in Table 1, little extant literature for discount pricing and product bundling has examined the 
effect of the strategies on sales of GaaS applications, as well as reporting inconsistent findings on their effect.  In 
addition, most relied on survey, experiment, or analytical modeling to investigate their effect.  Therefore, our study is 
one of the first attempts to explore the effects in the context of the fast-growing GaaS market with large empirical 
market data.  The remaining sections are as follows: Hypothesis Development introduces major hypotheses based on 
theoretical foundations.  Empirical Models describes analytic models to test the hypotheses, while Dataset discusses 
details of the dataset adopted. Analysis and Result illustrates analytic approach employed and hypothesis test results.  
Discussion presents interpretations and implications of the hypothesis test results, and Theoretical and Practical 
Contributions discusses how the findings contribute to academia and industry.  Limitations and Future Research 
illustrates recommendations for researchers investigating this topic, followed by Conclusion. 
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Table 1: Selected Research on Discount Pricing and Product Bundling 
Category Article Major Findings Market Data Source 
Discount 
Pricing 
Zuo & Iida [2017] 
Optimized discount rate (49%-64%) maximizes 
product sales at e-commerce website 
e-commerce 
Market Data 
(Amazon.JP) 
Ghose & Han 
[2014] 
Optimized discount rate (around 50%) maximizes 
mobile app sales 
Mobile App 
Market Data 
(gooleplay.com) 
DelVecchio and 
Puligadda [2012] 
Excessive discount pricing induces low quality 
perception on the product 
Food Experiment 
Coulter and 
Coulter [2007] 
Low discount rate for high-priced products is more 
effective than high rate for the low-priced 
In-line Skate Experiment 
Alford & Biswas 
[2002] 
Discount pricing increases perceived value and buying 
intention  
Apparel Experiment 
Ayres & 
Siegelman [1995] 
Effect of discount pricing differs by gender and 
ethnicity 
Automotive Survey 
Product 
Bundling 
Chung et al. 
[2013] 
The effect of bundling is reduced when bundled items 
have different brands 
None 
Analytical 
Modeling 
Lee & Kwon 
[2011] 
When bundled items are complementary bundling is 
more effective 
Ubiquitous 
services 
Analytical 
Modeling 
Lee et al. [2011] 
Higher discount on bundled products increases product 
sales 
Music CD Experiment 
Shen et al.  [2007] Bundling decreases perceived quality of the bundled 
Washer and 
dryer 
Experiment 
Agarwal & 
Chatterjee [2003] 
Similarity between bundled items increases the 
effectiveness of bundling 
Telecomm. 
(phone, TV, 
cellular) 
Experiment 
 
3. Hypothesis Development 
3.1. The Impact of Discount Pricing on the Sales of GaaS Applications 
Discount pricing is one of the most effective ways to increase sales [Chen et al. 2012; Dawson & Kim 2009].  
Two theoretical viewpoints can explain the reason: price fairness evaluation and expected utility.  In the evaluation of 
fairness of a product price, consumers use two types of price: perceived price and internal reference price [Sheng et 
al. 2007].  Perceived price refers to the price recognized by a consumer, generally a listed price of a product while 
internal reference price means a price that plays as a scale to evaluate the appropriateness of the perceived price.  If 
the perceived price is lower than the internal reference price, consumers may believe it is valuable [Kalyanaram & 
Winer 1995; Maxwell 2002].  Hence, the internal reference price has a significant influence to the purchase decision 
of consumers [Sheng et al. 2007].  Discount pricing encourages consumers to buy products by decreasing the perceived 
price, reducing the gap from their internal reference price.  It also decreases the internal reference price of consumers 
when multiple similar products at discounted prices are available.  Due to the lowered internal reference price, 
consumers perceive products at regular prices less valuable than those at discount.  The expected utility provides 
another explanation for the effectiveness of discount pricing.  Consumers, as rational and self-interested individuals, 
make economic decisions to maximize their benefits, taking account of the costs and benefits [Mongin 1997; 
Schoemaker 1982], suggesting that the individuals would not buy products when their prices are higher than their 
potential benefits [Reavis Conner & Rumelt 1991]. 
For software products, discount pricing is known to increase chance of buying software by decreasing the cost to 
attain the benefits [Chen & Png 1999].  A recent study of Ghose and Han [2014] also illustrated that the profit from 
mobile apps can be maximized when they are at discounted prices, suggesting that discount pricing can increase not 
only short-term sales but also overall net profit of the apps.  Although it may have a negative impact on sales by 
inducing low-quality perception [DelVecchio & Puligadda 2012; Dennedy & Marrs 2011; Raghubir & Corfman 1999], 
consumers in the digital product markets have affluent reference sources, such as consumer review (e.g., 5-start rating 
system) and online communities/forum, to verify the quality of the products at discounted prices.  Therefore, they 
would not necessarily drop off the discounted products in their purchase decision simply because of the discount.  
Given the discussion above, we propose the following hypothesis: 
H1: GaaS applications offered at discount price are likely to have higher sales than those at regular price. 
3.2. The Impact of Discount Rate on the Sales of GaaS Applications 
Consumers may pay attention to not only whether a desired product is at discounted price but also its discount 
rate.  Prior studies on discount pricing commonly indicated that consumers consider the rate important in their 
purchase decision [Chen et al. 1998; Coulter & Coulter 2007; Heath et al. 1995] because the rate would closely address 
the gap between their perceived price and their internal reference price on a product.  For instance, consumers would 
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perceive $10 discount more attractive for a t-shirt at $20 (i.e., 50% reduction in the perceived price) than for a TV at 
$200 (i.e., 5% reduction).  Likewise, consumers in the GaaS market would perceive applications at a higher discount 
rate more valuable.  Given that the GaaS market is a substantially competitive market where multiple vendors provide 
similar products [Murphy 2015], a high discount rate should promote the sales of GaaS applications by attracting more 
consumers.  Thus, we suggest the following hypothesis: 
H2: For the GaaS applications offered at discount, the sales of the applications is likely to increases as the 
discount rate increases.  
3.3. The Impact of the Amount of Discounted Price on the Sales of GaaS Applications 
Although discount rate is high, it may not be appealing if its original price is substantially low.  For example, a 
discount rate of 10% for a $50,000 automobile would allow consumers to save $5,000, while the same rate could only 
save $1 for a $10 frozen pizza.  Therefore, the amount of discounted price (i.e., difference between a regular price and 
a discount price) will be as important as the rate in the purchase decision of consumers. A recent study shows that 
price discount can directly lead to the increased volume of the promoted product on Google search [Zhao 2018], 
thereby contributing to its sales volume. Prior research on the impact of discount pricing on market demand illustrated 
that the amount of discounted price has a proportional relationship with the quantity of  product order [Hui-Ming & 
Yu 1997; Lee & Rosenblatt 1986] and overall sales volume [Raju 1992].  From the perspective of consumer behaviors, 
the amount can encourage more potential consumers by increasing the perceived value of the products [Della Bitta et 
al. 1981].  The price range of GaaS applications varies from $0.5 to $199.  Therefore, the consumers should consider 
the amount of discounted price, which represents their actual savings.  They would be more likely to purchase the 
applications when the savings are larger. This discussion induces the following hypothesis: 
H3: For the GaaS applications offered at discount, the sales of the applications is likely to increases as the 
amount of discounted price increases.  
3.4. The Number of Discount Deals and Sales of GaaS Applications 
Competitive intensity, which refers to the degree of competition in a market, is another important factor in 
estimating the impact of discount pricing.  The intensity tends to have a negative impact on the sales; If there are more 
competitors, each product in the market has more difficulties achieving sales increase [Raju 1992].  Likewise, the 
impact of discount pricing on sales would be subject to competitive intensity.  As more vendors offer their products 
at discounted prices, consumers would perceive the discount less attractive and consequently, each product should 
have fewer chances to increase its sales [Kopalle et al. 1999].   However, the large number of vendors offering discount 
deals may raise overall market demand, generating interests from more potential consumers.  In the e-commerce 
context, the traffic to shopping websites increase when they have more discount deals, such as Black Friday and Cyber 
Monday, and accordingly each may have higher sales on these days.   
Although both viewpoints are legitimate, we expect that the total number of discount deals will have a negative 
relationship with the sales of each application in the GaaS market.  Conventional e-commerce websites such as 
Amazon.com have numerous types of products.  The increased traffic to the websites by discount deals, hence, may 
generate cross-selling opportunities, encouraging the visitors to extend their purchase to other discounted products.  
According to research conducted by Amazon.com, cross-selling generates up to 35% of its revenue [Cohn 2015].  
However, GaaS application distributors such as steam.com, origin.com, and GOG.com provide only gaming 
applications, which directly compete against each other.  The increase of discount deals in a single product category 
would hardly generate cross-selling opportunities because consumers barely buy more products in the same category 
due to the discount.  In addition, consumers do not repurchase the same GaaS applications (i.e., repeat purchase) even 
though they are offered at discount because their value does not decrease or disappear as used.  As competitive 
intensity indicates, rather, the increase should cannibalize the sales of each application, inducing a severe price 
discount competition.  Therefore, we propose the following hypothesis: 
H4: For the GaaS applications offered at discount, the sales of the applications is likely to decrease as the number 
of discount deals available at that time increases.  
3.5. The Impact of Bundling on the Sales for GaaS Applications 
Bundling strategy refers to offering more than one products or services as a combined package [Adams & Yellen 
1976; Stremersch & Tellis 2002].  Due to added value by bundling of multiple products or services, consumers prefer 
bundled packages and consequently, the products tend to have higher sales than the unbundled [Stremersch & Tellis 
2002].  For digital information goods, prior studies reported that bundling has a positive impact on the sales of digital 
music [Zhu & MacQuarrie 2003], and mobile TV services [Rautio et al. 2006].   
In the video gaming market, product bundling has been widely adopted to boost sales, attracting potential 
consumers [Derdenger & Kumar 2013].  For example, Nintendo may introduce “Super Mario Bundle” including a 
series of Super Mario game titles such as Mario Cart and Super Mario Advance.  In the GaaS domain, vendors often 
bundle their applications with other applications, premium game contents, or music soundtrack of the game titles, 
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attracting more potential consumers.   As some extant literature argued, however, bundling can lower the perceived 
quality of the product particularly when it is new to market [Harris 1997].  This implies that when consumers have 
not experienced the bundle, they may doubt its quality, believing that it is bundled with other products (or features) 
because of lack of quality.  Because video gaming applications are experience goods, which consumers do not fully 
understand their quality before experiencing them [Lian & Yen 2013], consumers in the GaaS market would have a 
negative perception on the bundled.  However, such a quality concern about the bundled may lessen as the amount of 
available information to confirm the quality increases, providing indirect experience to the consumers [Ye et al. 2011].  
As aforementioned, consumers in the GaaS domain can have affluent indirect experience about the quality of 
applications through online communities/forum and consumer review.  Hence, the consumers would rely more on the 
indirect experience to examine the quality than simply perceive the bundle as low quality.  Therefore, we suggest the 
following hypothesis: 
H5: Bundled GaaS applications are likely to have higher sales than single applications. 
3.6. The Moderation Effect of Bundling on the Relationship between Discount Rate and Sales of GaaS Applications 
Discount pricing often combines with other additional offers such as bundling.  Consumers tend to perceive such 
products as more attractive [Sheng et al. 2007] and are more likely to purchase [Janiszewski & Cunha 2004].  This 
suggests that they perceive price discount more valuable when applied to a bundled package than a single product, if 
all other conditions are equal.  For example, if a single product and a bundled package have the same discount rate 
and discounted price, consumers would more likely purchase the bundle due to its additional value.  In the GaaS 
market, the vendors often apply price discount on bundled applications as well as on single ones. When a bundled 
package and a single application have the same discount rate, the bundle would attract more consumers due to its 
additional values such as gaming applications, game music soundtracks, and game contents (e.g., new game 
characters).  Therefore, we can expect that a higher discount rate should have a more significant impact on the sales 
of bundled application packages.  Based on this discussion, we suggest the following hypothesis:  
H6: For the bundled GaaS applications offered at discount, the sales of the applications is likely to increaseas 
the discount rate increases.  
Figure 1 summarizes the hypotheses discussed above, illustrating the relationships between the factors and sales 
of GaaS applications.   
 
 
 
Figure 1: Research Model 
 
4. Empirical Models 
We developed two empirical models to test our hypotheses. The dependent variable of the two models is 
DailySalesi,t, which represents the sales of each GaaS application.  Model 1 includes DiscountDummyi (c.f., 
discounted = 1, not discounted = 0) and BundleDummyi (c.f., bundled = 1, not bundled = 0), the variables for testing 
Hypotheses 1 and 5, as well as five control variables.  We constructed Model 2 to test how specific discount pricing 
factors affect the sales, such as discount rate, discounted price, and the number of available discount deals.  These 
factors should be examined in a separate model from Model 1 because Model 1 is estimated for all of the GaaS 
applications in the dataset to examine the impact of discount pricing and bundling on sales. The discount pricing 
factors should be estimated only for the applications offered at discount, which have the factors in the dataset. Model 
2 tests Hypotheses 2, 3, 4, and 6, examining the main and interaction effects of discount pricing and bundling on the 
sales.  The independents of Model 2 are DiscountRatei,t representing the percentage of price discount (H2), 
DiscountedPricei,t standing for the amount of price discounted (H3), DiscountDealsi,t meaning the total number of 
discount deals on the date (H4), and BundleDiscountRatei,t standing for the moderation effect of bundling on the 
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relationship between discount rate and the sales (H6).  It also contains five control variables.  Table 2 illustrates the 
definitions of the variables of Model 1 and Model 2. 
 
Model 1 testing H1 and H5: 
DailySalesi,t = α0 + α1DiscountDummyi,t + α2BundleDummyi + α3Ownersi,t + α4UserScorei,t   
                       + α5ProductAgei,t + α6CurrentPlayersi,t + α6Increasei,t +  εi,t 
  
Model 2 testing H2, H3, H4 and H6: 
DailySalesi,t  = β0 + β1DiscountRatei,t + β2DiscountedPricei, t + β3DiscountDealst  
                                   + β4BundleDummyi + β5BundleDiscountRatei, t + β6Ownersi,t + β7UserScorei,t  
                                   + β8ProductAgei,t + β9CurrentPlayersi,t + β10Increasei,t + εi,t 
 
Table 2: Definitions of Variables 
Variable Role Definition 
DailySalesi,t Dep. The daily sales of GaaS i on date t 
DiscountDummyi,t Ind. If GaaS i offers price discount = 1, if not = 0 
DiscountRatei,t Ind. The discount rate of GaaS i on date t 
BundleDummyi Ind. If GaaS i is bundled = 1, if not = 0 
BundleDiscountRatei,t Ind. The interaction term of BundleDummy and DiscountRate of GaaS i on date t 
DiscountedPricei,t Ind. The amount of discounted price of GaaS i on date t 
DiscountDealst Ind. The number of discount deals on date t 
Ownersi,t Cont. The number of owners of GaaS i on date t 
UserScorei,t Cont. The accumulated evaluation score on GaaS i on date t  
ProductAgei,t   Cont. The age of GaaS i on data t (i.e., how long has been in the market) 
CurrentPlayersi,t Cont. The number of GaaS i players in last two weeks on date t 
Increasei,t Cont. The increase in percentage GaaS i on date t compared to the number of owners on date t-1 
※ Dep.: Dependent Variable, Ind.: Independent Variable, Cont.: Control Variable  
 
5. Dataset 
We collected data from two data sources, steamspy.com and steamdb.info.  Steamspy.com provides a sales 
tracking service for GaaS applications served by Steam, which is the largest GaaS provider in the world.  Steam has 
the largest number of active user accounts in the GaaS market, approximately 40 million taking more than 50% of the 
entire downloadable PC games [Chiang 2011; Mudgal 2012; Reinhardt 2012].  The data available in Steamspy.com 
include daily sales, total number of owners, price, active players, and average playtime.  Although the data are 
estimated based on a sampling approach using approximately 100,000 to 150,000 user accounts per day, they are 
known to be highly accurate [Gilbert 2015], close to the real data within 0.33% error margin [Orland 2015].  We 
collected the data for pricing discount, such as discount rate and discounted price at steamdb.info.  The website offers 
various information about special deals on the applications.  We collected daily data from the two websites for four 
months, from November 11, 2015 to March 11, 2016.  
Table 3 is the descriptive statistics of the variables in Model 1. Our dataset includes 112,858 observations of 5,570 
GaaS applications.  In the dataset, 11,501 observations of 3,210 products were concerned with discount pricing and/or 
bundling.  We used the entire dataset for Model 1 to examine the impact of discount pricing and bundling on sales 
(i.e., comparison between the applications with vs. without price discount or bundling).  Testing Model 2, we adopted 
the 11,501 observations of 3,210 GaaS applications that are offered at discount because it tests how the impact of 
discount pricing on sales differs by the degree of specific discount factors such as discount rate, discounted price, and 
the number of discount deals (i.e., competitors) available in the market.  Table 4 provides the descriptive statistics of 
the variables in Model 2.     
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Table 3: Descriptive Statistics of Model 1 
Variables Mean Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum 
DailySales 4524.269 4487.985 1001 121495 
Owners 367221.400 875365.400 1167 20700000 
UserScore 0.758 0.179 0.030 1 
ProductAge 1094.955 835.869 0 4625 
CurrentPlayers  605.637 9981.024 0 669198 
Increase 0.056 0.091 0.0001 7.881 
                                           Frequency (n=112,858) 
DiscountDummy 6546 
BundleDummy 452 
 
Table 4: Descriptive Statistics of Model 2 
Variables Mean Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum 
DailySales 4253.996 5815.123 1001 121495 
DiscountRate 0.643 0.204 0.100 0.950 
DiscountedPrice 9.564 15.349 0.988 539.910 
DiscountDeals 3759.883 2621.161 80 5877 
Owners 354484.200 1152566 1167 20400000 
UserScore  0.757 0.184 0.080 1 
ProductAge 865.807 860.860 0 6290 
CurrentPlayers 887.291 13515.470 0 653957 
Increase 0.0767 0.169 0.0001 7.162 
                                                Frequency (n=11,501) 
BundleDummy 36 
 
6. Analysis and Results 
Since our dataset is panel data, we conducted specification tests for OLS estimation assumptions. For both models, 
VIF (Variance Inflation Factors) did not indicate a significant multicollinearity (VIF: Model 1 = 1.12, Model 2 = 1.27).  
Not surprisingly, however, Breusch-Pagan/Cook-Wisberg test and Wooldridge test respectively reported 
heteroscedasticity and first-order autocorrelation in both Model 1 and Model 2.  Therefore, we used a random effects 
model with Hueber/White standard error correction to address the issues [Baltagi 2008; Freedman 2012].  Although 
Hausman specification test indicated the necessity of a fixed effects estimator, it is inappropriate for our models 
because the estimator eliminates important time-invariant variables in the models.  In addition, because the dataset 
has substantially larger number of the applications (5,570 applications) than the number of time-period (162 days), 
the fixed effects estimator is highly inefficient in terms of degree of freedom.  
Table 5 demonstrates the analysis results for Model 1 and Model 2, including coefficients and p-values of the 
variables.  Model 1 tests Hypothesis 1 and Hypothesis 5.  The coefficient for DiscountDummyi (H1) for testing the 
impact of price discount on GaaS sales is positive and significant at the 1% level.  This result supports Hypothesis 1. 
The coefficient of BundleDummyi (H5) is positive and statistically significant at the 1% level.  This suggests that 
bundled GaaS applications tend to have higher sales than unbundled, supporting Hypothesis 5. 
We examined Hypothesis 2, Hypothesis 3, Hypothesis 4, and Hypothesis 6 with Model 2.  The coefficient for 
DiscountRatei,t (H2) is positive and significant at the 1% level.  This implies that the higher the discount rate of a 
GaaS application, the higher the daily sales, supporting Hypothesis 2.  The coefficient for DiscountedPrice i,t (H3) is 
positive and significant at the 1% level. This indicates that the daily sales of the applications increases as the amount 
of discounted price does, supporting Hypothesis 3.  The coefficient for DiscountDealsi,t (H4) is negative and 
significant at the 1% level, suggesting a negative relationship between the number of the discount deals and the sales 
of each application.  This negative relationship suggests that the sales of each application at a discount decreases as 
the number of the deals increases at the time, supporting Hypothesis 4.  The coefficient for interaction term, 
BundleDiscountRatei,t, (H6) is positive but not statistically significant, which does not support Hypothesis 6. 
In order to examine potential lag effects of the independent variables, we regressed the dependent, DailySalesi,t, 
on lagged independent variables because their actual impact on the sales may be shown a few days later.  We ran 
DailySalesi,t on the independent variables at t-1 day, t-2 day, and t-3 day.  Although their coefficients slightly differ 
by the time points, overall hypothesis results remain constant with the initial results reported in Table 2.  In both 
models, however, the major independents were not significant when we extended the time lag to more than t-3 day.  
This is understandable because the applications in our dataset conducted discount pricing for 3.26 days on average.  
Figure 2 summarizes the overall hypothesis test results. 
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Table 5: Analysis Results of Model 1 and Model 2 
Dependent: DailySalesi,t Model 1(All GaaS’s) Model 2 (GaaS’s at Discount) 
DiscountDummyi (H1) 173.135**                NA 
DiscountRatei,t (H2) NA 720.494* 
DiscountedPrice i,t (H3)                        NA 17.965** 
DiscountDeals t (H4) NA -0.066** 
BundleDummyi (H5) 942.556** -1441.776 
BundleDiscountRate i,t (H6) NA 3488.334 
Ownersi,t (control)                                0.003** 0.003** 
UserScorei,t (control)  2156.499** 25.542** 
ProductAgei,t (control)  0.169** 0.454** 
CurrentPlayersi,t (control)  -0.031** 0.216* 
Increasei,t (control)  -229.387 1674.905** 
Constant  1752.430** 334.364 
Fit Statistics (Wald χ2)  793.47** 972.57** 
※ *p < 5%, ** p < 1% 
 
 
Figure 2: Summary of Hypothesis Test Results 
 
7. Discussion 
Support for Hypothesis 1 indicates that discount pricing has a positive impact on the sales of GaaS applications.  
This result corresponds to the previous studies that employed price fairness evaluation and expected utility theories.  
This implies that consumers in the GaaS market have similar purchase behaviors to those in other domains.  In addition, 
it suggests that discount pricing is effective to increase the sales of the applications.  Therefore, practitioners in the 
market may consider this strategy to increase the sales.  Support for Hypothesis 2 and Hypothesis 3 suggests that both 
discount rate and the amount of discounted price have positive relationships with the sales of the applications.  These 
findings are consistent with the extant literature concerning discount pricing, illustrating the positive effect of discount 
rate [Chen et al. 1998; Coulter & Coulter 2007; Heath et al. 1995] and the amount of discounted price [Della Bitta et 
al. 1981; Hui-Ming & Yu 1997; Lee & Rosenblatt 1986; Raju 1992] on sales.  We conducted an additional analysis 
to examine how discount pricing affected the sales of the applications, comparing each application’s average sales 
when it is at a discount and at an original price.  As illustrated in Fig. 3, our findings suggest that on average, the sales 
does not necessarily increase as the rate increases; the rate between 40% and 50% generated the highest sales increase, 
selling approximately 421 more copies.  This is fairly consistent with the result of Ghose and Han [2014], reporting 
that the optimal discount rate to boost sales of mobile apps is approximately 50%.  This implies that higher discount 
rate may not necessarily guarantee higher sales increase although the discount leads to a positive sales change.  This 
finding is consistent with the literature on discount pricing that excessive discount pricing on products with uncertainty 
can decrease the perceived value of the products [Bergemann & Välimäki 2006; Bojanic 1996].  Because GaaS 
applications are digital experience goods, excessive discount may impose a doubt about the quality of the applications, 
thus discouraging consumers’ purchase.  Figure 3 illustrates the comparison of the effects by discount rates on the 
sales of the applications.  
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Figure 3: Effects of Discount Pricing on Daily Sales by Rate 
 
As Hypothesis 4 predicted, we found that the number of the applications offered at discounted price has a negative 
relationship with the sales of each application.  It implies that if there are more discounted GaaS applications, each 
tends to have lower sales.  This is consistent with the previous literature on competitive intensity; as the number of 
discount deals increases, each product has fewer chances to generate sales [Kopalle et al. 1999; Raju 1992].  Therefore, 
the practitioners in the market may consider executing discount pricing when fewer competitors offer it.  It also extends 
the knowledge about discount pricing by illustrating that as the number of total discount deals in the market increases, 
its effect decreases.  
Support for Hypothesis 5 indicates a positive impact of bundling strategy for GaaS applications on their sales.  
This shows that the bundles have advantage in their sales, corresponding to the extant literature [Bakos & Brynjolfsson 
1999; Rautio et al. 2006; Stremersch & Tellis 2002; Zhu & MacQuarrie 2003].  However, the bundling does not have 
a significant moderation effect on the relationship between discount rate and the sales of the applications, not 
supporting Hypothesis 6.  This result implies that although a higher discount rate helps increasing the sales of the 
applications, the effect is neither more nor less significant for the bundles.  One of the possible explanations for this 
unexpected result is the attractiveness of added contents (i.e., bundled products) to the applications offered at 
discounted prices.  In the datasets used for this study, most discounted applications are generally bundled with trivial 
contents, such as game instructions, characters, or stages, which may be insufficient to appeal to the consumers. 
 
8. Theoretical and Practical Contributions 
This research provides theoretical contributions to the literature of price fairness evaluation and expected utility.  
It extends the scope of the theories to the GaaS market by suggesting empirical evidence of the effect of discount 
pricing on sales increase.  The findings of this study indicate that discount pricing reduces the gap between internal 
reference price and perceived price, encouraging consumers to purchase products [Kalyanaram & Winer 1995; 
Maxwell 2002].  In terms of expected utility, consumers in the market, who are rational individuals, are more likely 
to purchase products when the same benefits are attainable at lower costs [Mongin 1997; Schoemaker 1982].  Similarly, 
the consumers tend to prefer bundled applications to the singles because they can obtain more benefits (i.e., bundled 
items) at the same cost.  In addition, this research is one of the first attempts to consider competitive intensity in 
discount pricing literature.  It illustrates that the effect of the discount decreases as the number of competitors offering 
discount deals increases, supporting the theory.  This is particularly important for discount pricing literature 
concerning digital product markets (e.g., digital music and mobile apps), where a tremendous number of products 
compete by changing their price frequently.   In the dataset adopted in this study, for instance, discount pricing lasted 
for 3.26 days on average, indicating prevalence of dynamic pricing in the market. 
The findings discussed above suggest useful implications for practitioners in the GaaS market.  First, discount 
pricing is effective for sales increase of GaaS applications.  However, practitioners who want to boost sales of GaaS 
applications will have to consider both discount rate and discounted price in planning discount pricing.   For instance, 
high discount rate might not generate expected sales increase if the actual discounted price (i.e., saved cost by 
consumers) is minimal because the consumers consider both factors in the discount deals.  Concerning optimal 
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discount rate for maximizing sales increase, our study suggests that it ranges between 40% and 50%.  However, the 
effect tends to lessen as more competitors offer discount deals at the time.  This finding implies that overall demand 
for GaaS applications does not necessarily increase as the number of the deals increase, which is different from the 
general belief in the e-commerce domain [eMarketer 2017].  For conducting discount pricing, thus, the practitioners 
need to avoid busy seasons when the deals are pervasive in the market because their deals can be less noticeable or 
perceived unattractive by consumers.  This study also shows that bundling can increase sales of GaaS applications. 
The practitioners may expect sales increase by bundling their applications with additional contents such as game music, 
characters, or other GaaS applications.  However, it would not generate additional sales increase although combined 
with discount pricing, suggesting that the practitioners need to utilize each strategy respectively. GaaS providers may 
also want to consider offer GaaS applications to potential users with basic features free of charge and premium features 
for additional payment in addition to the pricing and bundling strategies. The freemium marketing strategy could be 
effective at increasing the number of potential users, and promoting their interactions, thereby increasing sales and 
sustainable profitability [Kim 2018].   
    
9. Limitations and Future Research 
As with other studies, our research has several limitations.  With regard to bundling strategy, GaaS applications 
use various types of bundling strategies by added contents such as free video titles, instructions, game OST, and 
extended game contents.  Although they must have different effects on the sales, however, we did not distinguish in 
testing the relevant hypotheses.  In addition, while estimating the impact of the number of total discount deals on the 
sales of the applications, we did not distinguish direct and indirect competitors.  For instance, a FPS (First Person 
Shooter) GaaS application directly competes with the applications in the same genre but would not with RPG (Role 
Playing Games) applications.  Future research may consider adopting more thoroughly categorized data for different 
types of bundling strategies and direct/indirect competitors in their analysis.   Another limitation is concerned with 
the datasets adopted in the analysis.  Although the datasets are large, including approximately 113,000 observations, 
they cover four months from November 2015 to March 2016.  Therefore, they may not represent the overall market 
dynamics of the GaaS market.  In addition, the period includes important peak seasons such as Thanksgiving, 
Christmas, and New Year.  Therefore, our findings may be partially subject to the sales of the peak seasons and 
consequently, may not demonstrate general effects of discount pricing and bundling strategies in the domain.  
Researchers investigating this topic may consider using a more extensive dataset to rule out these potential biases in 
their research. Many factors, such as sense of gaming community, social influence, social influence, could also affect 
the sales of GaaS applications [Hsieh 2018]. Future study may want to investigate whether pricing and bundling 
strategies have varying influence on the sales of GaaS applications in different gaming communities. Moreover, there 
is one possibility for the insignificance of the interaction between bundle and discount rate found in the study. It is 
possible that gamers may already have some of the games in the bundle, thus the discount rate of the bundle is still 
less economic than buying the additional games separately. This could be another future research direction. 
 
10. Conclusions   
As the number of video games are available on the cloud, vendors need to compete with each other on the delivery 
of not only exciting gaming experiences but also attractive deals.  We investigated the effects of discount pricing and 
bundling on the sales of GaaS applications, adopting large empirical market data collected at steamspy.com and 
steamdb.info.  In the context of the fast-growing GaaS market, our analysis results confirmed the positive effect of 
discount pricing, discount rate, and the amount of discounted price on the sales, while the effect decreases as the 
number of available discount deals increases.  However, we did not find an empirical evidence supporting that 
combining discount pricing with bundling is necessarily more appealing to consumers in the market.  Our findings 
also verified the positive effect of product bundling on the sales increase of the applications.  The overall findings 
contribute to the theoretical foundations of perceived value, price fairness, expected utility, and competitive intensity 
by providing empirical evidences on the concepts.  In the practical aspect, practitioners in the GaaS domain may utilize 
the findings to design effective pricing and bundling strategies for sales increase. 
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